@article {1970726,
	title = {Executive Compensation and Agency Issues in Italy},
	journal = {International Journal of Corporate Governance},
	volume = {5},
	year = {2014},
	month = {2014},
	abstract = {From a theoretical perspective, we posit that that dividend policies may be relevant in resolving agency issues even in a governance environment dominated by family controlled firms. Earlier research has found that in more market based systems such as the US and Canada, dividends are in fact instrumental in solving agency issues. Prior empirical research has also found that dividends have a role in mitigating agency conflicts in a bank-dominated corporate environments like that in Germany (Elston and Goldberg, 2003). This paper extends the findings of earlier research by empirically investigating whether dividends retain their importance as the mechanism for resolving residual agency issues in a family controlled governance environment like Italy},
	keywords = {Finance, OSU-Cascades},
	author = {Elston,Julie and Rondi,Laura and Bhattacharyya,Nalanaksha}
}
@article {1970751,
	title = {Corporate Governance and Capital Accumulation: Firm Level Evidence from Italy},
	journal = {Scottish Journal of Political Economy},
	volume = {56},
	year = {2009},
	month = {2009},
	pages = {634-661},
	abstract = {This study investigates the impact of investor protection on firm ownership and investment decisions in a model where investor protection is allowed to vary across firms. Using firm panel data for Italy, we construct firm level variables to capture the degree of investor protection which is specific to the firm and observable by outside shareholders. Empirical evidence indicates that the stronger the investor protections the lower the fraction of equity that is owned by insiders. Results also suggest that higher insider equity ownership is linked to a larger risk premium and higher costs of capital for the firm. Finally, our findings indicate that the magnitude of capital stock distortions is important when shareholder protection is weak and ownership concentration is high.},
	keywords = {Finance, OSU-Cascades},
	author = {Elston,Julie and Rondi,Laura}
}
@article {1970756,
	title = {Shareholder Protection and the Cost of Capital: Evidence from German and Italian Firms},
	journal = {Statistica Applicata (Italian Journal of Applied Statistics)},
	volume = {18},
	year = {2007},
	month = {2007},
	pages = {153-172},
	abstract = {We investigate the interaction of investor protection, ownership concentration and firms{\textquoteright} financing and investment decisions in a model where investor protection is allowed to vary across firms. Using firm panel data for Italy, we construct firm level variables to capture the degree of investor protection which is specific to the firm and observable by outside shareholders. We find that the stronger the investor protections the lower the fraction of equity that is owned by insiders. We also find that the higher the insider equity ownership the higher the idiosyncratic risk premium in the cost of capital. Finally, our results indicate that the magnitude of capital stock distortions is quite important when shareholder protection is weak and ownership concentration is high.},
	keywords = {Finance, OSU-Cascades},
	author = {Elston,Julie and Rondi,Laura}
}
