@article {1970691,
	title = {An Empirical Examination of Firm Growth in the MENA Region: Through the Lens of Gibrat{\textquoteright}s Law},
	journal = {Small Business Economics},
	volume = {60},
	year = {2022},
	month = {2022},
	pages = {121-131},
	keywords = {Finance, OSU-Cascades},
	url = {https://www.springer.com/economics/microeconomics/journal/40812},
	author = {Elston,Julie and Weidinger,Alois Konrad}
}
@article {1977861,
	title = {Evidence on the Dynamic Nature of Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China},
	year = {2018},
	month = {2018},
	address = {Copenhagen},
	keywords = {Finance, OSU-Cascades},
	author = {Elston,Julie}
}
@article {1977856,
	title = {An Examination of the Relationship Between Size and Growth of Listed Firms in the United Arab Emirates},
	year = {2018},
	month = {2018},
	address = {Oxford, UK},
	keywords = {Accounting, Finance, OSU-Cascades},
	author = {Elston,Julie and Weidinger,Alois and Widmer,Melanie}
}
@article {1970716,
	title = {Evidence on the Dynamic Nature of Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China},
	journal = {International Journal of Corporate Governance},
	volume = {7},
	year = {2016},
	month = {2016},
	keywords = {Finance, OSU-Cascades},
	author = {Elston,Julie}
}
@article {1970726,
	title = {Executive Compensation and Agency Issues in Italy},
	journal = {International Journal of Corporate Governance},
	volume = {5},
	year = {2014},
	month = {2014},
	abstract = {From a theoretical perspective, we posit that that dividend policies may be relevant in resolving agency issues even in a governance environment dominated by family controlled firms. Earlier research has found that in more market based systems such as the US and Canada, dividends are in fact instrumental in solving agency issues. Prior empirical research has also found that dividends have a role in mitigating agency conflicts in a bank-dominated corporate environments like that in Germany (Elston and Goldberg, 2003). This paper extends the findings of earlier research by empirically investigating whether dividends retain their importance as the mechanism for resolving residual agency issues in a family controlled governance environment like Italy},
	keywords = {Finance, OSU-Cascades},
	author = {Elston,Julie and Rondi,Laura and Bhattacharyya,Nalanaksha}
}
@article {1970206,
	title = {Entrepreneurial motives and characteristics: An analysis of small restaurant owners},
	journal = {International Journal of Hospitality Management},
	volume = {35},
	year = {2013},
	month = {2013},
	pages = {294-305},
	keywords = {Finance, OSU-Cascades, OSU-Cascades Hospitality Mgt},
	author = {Elston,Julie and Chen,Sandy}
}
@article {1977941,
	title = {Entrepreneurship in China},
	year = {2011},
	month = {2011},
	address = {Orlando, FL},
	keywords = {Finance, OSU-Cascades},
	author = {Elston,Julie}
}
@article {1970776,
	title = {Executive Compensation and Agency Costs in Germany},
	journal = {Journal of Banking \& Finance},
	volume = {27},
	year = {2003},
	month = {2003},
	pages = {1391-1410},
	abstract = {With the growth of international mergers like DaimlerChrysler, interest in executive compensation practices abroad, particularly in Germany, has increased. Using unique data sources for Germany, we find that similar to US firms, German firms also have agency problems caused by the separation of ownership from control, with ownership dispersion leading to higher compensation. In addition, there is evidence that bank influence has a negative impact on compensation.},
	keywords = {Finance, OSU-Cascades},
	author = {Elston,Julie and Goldberg,Larry}
}
@article {1978116,
	title = {Executive Compensation and Agency Costs in Germany},
	year = {2001},
	month = {2001},
	address = {Dublin Ireland},
	keywords = {Finance, OSU-Cascades},
	author = {Elston,Julie and Goldberg,Larry}
}
@article {1978131,
	title = {Executive Compensation and Agency Costs},
	year = {1999},
	month = {1999},
	address = {San Diego CA},
	keywords = {Finance, OSU-Cascades},
	author = {Elston,Julie}
}
