01730nas a2200181 4500008004100000245012500041210006900166260000900235300001000244490000800254520104000262653003201302100001601334700001801350700002201368700002001390856013801410 2020 eng d00aCelebrity CEO, Identity Threat, and Impression Management: Impact of Celebrity Status on Corporate Social Responsibility0 aCelebrity CEO Identity Threat and Impression Management Impact o c2020 a69-840 v1113 aIn this study, we examine the impact of CEO celebrity status on the propensity of firms to
engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Integrating identity and impression management
theories, we argue that a firm’s engagement in CSR activities is affected by a celebrity CEO’s
impression management motive to maintain his/her identity and status as a celebrity. We then
explore three boundary conditions under which the effects of celebrity status on CSR may be
strengthened. We find that celebrity CEOs’ engagement in CSR activities as an impression
management tactic increases when uncertainty surrounding a firm’s expected performance is
high, when firm performance is low, and the competitive intensity of the industry is high. The
findings of this study provide useful insights into the specific ways by which celebrity CEOs
attempt to protect their established status and reputation. This paper contributes to various
domains of research concerning CEOs, impression management, and CSR.10aStrategy & Entrepreneurship1 aLee, Gilsoo1 aCho, Sam, Yul1 aArthurs, Jonathan1 aLee, Eun, Kyung uhttps://dev.business.oregonstate.edu/biblio/celebrity-ceo-identity-threat-and-impression-management-impact-celebrity-status-corporate01502nas a2200181 4500008004100000245006400041210006100105260000900166300001200175490000700187520091200194653003201106100001601138700001801154700002201172700002001194856010601214 2019 eng d00aCEO Pay Inequity, CEO-TMT Pay Gap, and Acquisition Premiums0 aCEO Pay Inequity CEOTMT Pay Gap and Acquisition Premiums c2019 a105-1160 v983 aThis study extends previous research on the influence of CEO pay inequity on CEOs' decision-making by examining the relationship in the acquisition context. Focusing on CEOs' compensation vis-à-vis external and internal referents, we find that underpaid CEOs pay higher acquisition premiums and that overpaid CEOs pay lower premiums, although this tendency is reduced as the level of overpayment increases, creating a U-shaped relationship. We further find that the CEO-TMT pay gap moderates the relationship between CEO under-/overpayment and acquisition premiums by adjusting CEOs' perceptions of pay inequity and motivation to restore inequity through their higher or lower sense of self-importance. The findings of this study suggest that CEOs' decision-making is strongly influenced by their framing of gains and losses and the perception of pay inequity
vis-à-vis external and internal referents.10aStrategy & Entrepreneurship1 aLee, Gilsoo1 aCho, Sam, Yul1 aArthurs, Jonathan1 aLee, Eun, Kyung uhttps://dev.business.oregonstate.edu/biblio/ceo-pay-inequity-ceo-tmt-pay-gap-and-acquisition-premiums