02180nas a2200145   4500008004100000245006600041210006500107260000900172490000700181520172400188653001501912100001801927700001701945856007201962       2020                        eng d00aImprinting founders' blueprints on management control systems0 aImprinting founders blueprints on management control systems  c20200 v463 aIn this paper we seek to understand the influence of founders on the design and use of management control systems (MCS) through a theoretical lens known as imprinting. The organizational literature shows that founders are a source of imprinting, since their unique background informs the blueprint for their organization, which can affect patterns of organizational design and development. We undertake a case study of an innovative early-stage growth-focused manufacturing firm established by founders who espoused a commitment blueprint (one of five possible blueprints). Founders who have a commitment blueprint aim to establish a workplace where employees feel an intense emotional attachment to each other and the firm and are passionate about the firm’s vision. We examine how founders’ commitment blueprint influences the design and use of MCS. We show that the imprint of a founder’s commitment blueprint is reflected in the design and use of cultural controls and employee selection to establish a workplace that fosters an intense emotional attachment and identification comparable to a family’s, with an organizational culture where employees are committed and passionate about the firm. While these controls have previously been shown to make up the central components of a commitment blueprint, our results reveal a reliance on cultural controls and employee selection is not exclusive, but supported and reinforced through managers’ design and use of personnel controls, results controls, action controls, penalties, and informal controls. We also find a reluctance to implement controls that are seen as bureaucratic, since it is felt they would negatively influence the organizational culture.10aAccounting1 aAkroyd, Chris1 aKober, Ralph  uhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S104450051930022800453nas a2200133   4500008004100000245005300041210004900094260001900143653001500162100001800177700001900195700001800214856008700232       2016                        eng d00aThe Influence of Budgeting on Product Innovation0 aInfluence of Budgeting on Product Innovation  aBath, UKc201610aAccounting1 aAkroyd, Chris1 aHorii, Satoshi1 aSawabe, Norio  uhttps://dev.business.oregonstate.edu/biblio/influence-budgeting-product-innovation00525nas a2200121   4500008004100000245008800041210006900129260002200198653001500220100002000235700001800255856013000273       2014                        eng d00aInformation Technology Requirements for Newly Hired Management Accounting Graduates0 aInformation Technology Requirements for Newly Hired Management A  aSan Antonioc201410aAccounting1 aSpraakman, Gary1 aAkroyd, Chris  uhttps://dev.business.oregonstate.edu/biblio/information-technology-requirements-newly-hired-management-accounting-graduates-000473nas a2200121   4500008004100000245006500041210006400106260002200170653001500192100002200207700001800229856010400247       2013                        eng d00aInvestigating The Role Of Stand-alone Sustainability Reports0 aInvestigating The Role Of Standalone Sustainability Reports  aKobe, Japanc201310aAccounting1 aJollands, Stephen1 aAkroyd, Chris  uhttps://dev.business.oregonstate.edu/biblio/investigating-role-stand-alone-sustainability-reports-001460nas a2200157   4500008004100000245008900041210006900130260000900199300001400208490000700222520095300229653001501182100002001197700001801217856006701235       2011                        eng d00aThe Integration Substitute: The Role of Controls in Managing Human Asset Specificity0 aIntegration Substitute The Role of Controls in Managing Human As  c2011  a1055-10860 v513 aAs the integration solution to the problem of specific assets cannot be replicated on human asset specificity because slavery is illegal, economic theory states that control systems substitute for integration through a balanced structure to help align diverse interests. To understand the intricate design features of the balance, we examine a case-study firm. For low human asset specificity, the restriction and segregation of usable decision rights link with standards. However, incentives are traced to individuals only to the extent task deviations do not create relevant future costs that are difficult to be self-corrected. For high specificity, incentives are related to outputs rather than outcomes, because outcome variations reduce the attractiveness of maintaining the balance. Subjective assessment is used as an efficient alternate ‘balancing’ solution and decision control is shared when available subjective data are inadequate.10aAccounting1 aSridharan, V.G.1 aAkroyd, Chris  uhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-629X